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Society, Resistance and Revolution: the Budapest Middle Class and the Hungarian 
Communist State 1948-1956

 
 
Accounts of resistance to Communist states have dominated the historiographies of 
central-eastern European countries since 1989. The anti-Stalinist protests in Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, peasant opposition to collectivization and the dissident 
„civil society‟ movements of the 1980s have become the most popular research topics. In 
addition, left-wing dissidents, the catholic church and conservative nationalists have used 
resistance stories to establish themselves as anti-Communist fighters in the popular 
consciousness.
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 The idealization of resistance has meant that even inter-war and wartime 
rightist leaders of the 1930s and 1940s have been openly celebrated as national heroes for 
attempting to prevent the occupation of their countries by the Red Army, despite their 
involvement in the Holocaust.
2
 This celebration of dissent was in part a reaction to the 
silences of the Communist historiographies which preceded it.
3
 Yet as different groups 
have sought political respectability by placing themselves at the forefront of anti-
Communist opposition, so the post-Communist estimation of resistance has developed 
beyond its actual historical scale.
4
 
 
Despite widespread dislike of Communist regimes by the early 1950s, there was in fact 
very little concerted political resistance. Well-known outbreaks, such as the 1956 
uprising in Hungary or the Solidarity movement in Poland, were remarkable exceptions. 
Historians and political scientists have usually resorted to „top down‟ explanations to 
explain the absence; this is especially true of the 1950s in central-eastern Europe, where 
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brutal Stalinist states made effective opposition difficult. According to these accounts, 
only when the state weakened – owing to political infighting between hardliners and 
moderates in the period of de-Stalinization, or after the signing of human rights protocols 
with the West in the mid-1970s – did greater possibilities for resistance develop. Yet 
these analyses too often assume that a society in opposition will always combat the state 
given sufficient opportunities.
5
 Much less attention has been paid to the range of 
strategies that social groups used in order to survive under illegitimate power and the 
varied (and often ambivalent) attitudes they held towards the expression of resistance.
6
 
 
This article will explore the variety of attitudes towards, and expressions of, opposition 
by the Budapest middle classes, in their encounter with the Communist state between its 
inception in 1948 and its initial breakdown in the 1956 uprising.
7
 Most members of the 
middle classes experienced discrimination and persecution on account of their class 
background.
8
 Even those who had been initially sympathetic to the Communist project 
were questioning their allegiance and turning against the state by the early 1950s. Yet the 
middle class did not express their opposition to the regime in uniform ways; some 
engaged in active opposition whilst others deliberately withdrew from direct political 
confrontation. 
 
The choice to resist was not dependent on the degree to which different groups felt 
opposed to Communism, but rather on the extent to which they thought it appropriate to 
engage politically with illegitimate power. The codes which defined acceptable levels of 
engagement were shaped by different political traditions within the middle class. 
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Conservatives, who abhorred the Communist state more than any other group, saw 
engagement, even in the form of resistance, as collaboration with an illegitimate regime. 
Liberals, by contrast, saw political involvement, albeit at the margins of Communist 
society, as crucial to their identities. Socialists had the most complex attitudes to 
engagement: they withdrew from political opposition when their dislike of the Stalinist 
state was at its most intense, but engaged in open political struggle when the re-
establishment of the integrity of the Communist movement became a realistic possibility 
after 1953.  
 
The evidence is primarily drawn from an oral history project in which I interviewed 
seventy-six individuals from the Budapest middle class, born between 1907 and 1938, 
about their experiences of the Second World War, the liberation era and the early 
Communist state. These interviews addressed not only resistance, but also topics such as 
private life, educational and professional attainment, and the evolution of political 
attitudes. They were conducted between 1998 and 2000 and averaged around three hours 
in length. There were thirty-one female and forty-five male respondents. All interviewees 
were promised anonymity; hence all names used are pseudonyms. 
 
This article focuses on how individuals responded to Communist power and how they 
interpreted their behaviour. Hence it is not useful to impose any strict criteria on what 
resistance entails; rather, it is more informative to explore the conflicting definitions 
offered by the respondents themselves. For this reason, any act, from listening to jazz in 
private or discussing the behaviour of Red Army soldiers amongst groups of friends, to 
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establishing an anti-Communist organization or engaging in sabotage, will be considered 
resistance so long as it was consciously pursued as such. At the same time, it is also 
important to analyse those acts which undermined the norms of Communist behaviour, 
even when not defined as resistance by respondents. It is revealing to examine why 
certain forms of opposition were not considered to be resistance; certainly, they should 
not be ignored because they were not consciously defined as such. 
 
The importance of political tradition in shaping behaviour under the Communist state was 
the result of deep ideological divisions within Hungarian society. After the First World 
War, middle-class Hungarians‟ life chances were increasingly shaped by their political 
beliefs: the short-lived Communist regime of 1919 inflicted terror on the right; the 
subsequent right-wing authoritarian Horthy regime then excluded the left-wing and 
Jewish middle class from public service employment and political power throughout the 
inter-war period; the wartime German occupation and subsequent Hungarian fascist 
regime further terrorized the politically active left and Jews; the post-war anti-fascist 
popular front subsequently denied large sections of the conservative middle class the 
right either to vote or to return to public employment. By the end of the Second World 
War, these political divides were reinforced by social and religious divisions within the 
middle class; the public sector was dominated by those from conservative Christian 
gentry backgrounds who had been promoted by Horthy, whereas a more heterogeneous 
entrepreneurial and professional middle class (which included many from Jewish 
backgrounds
9
) was mainly liberal-left in political outlook. Thus in the decades which 
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preceded the Communist take-over, middle-class Hungarians‟ lives had been moulded as 
much by their political allegiances as by their social background. 
 
The conservative middle class was more deeply opposed to the Communist state than any 
other of these groups. Hungarian conservatism itself had grown out of a fear of radical 
left-wing upheaval; many had been drawn to the right-wing authoritarianism of the 
Horthy era out of a fear of Soviet Bolshevism and the return of the Hungarian 
Communist regime.
10
 Their experience of the Second World War reinforced this view; 
most conservatives had supported their country‟s alliance with Nazi Germany and fight 
against the Soviet Union, and came to understand the war as the struggle of Christian, 
conservative Europe against a barbarous eastern Bolshevism. In the late 1940s, 
conservatives ignored the progressive policies that attracted some of their countrymen to 
radical left-wing ideology; rather, Communism was understood as an alien political force 
which had destroyed the Hungarian nation and victimized its people. 
 
Despite their opposition, conservatives were the group least likely to engage in acts of 
resistance against the Communist regime. Explanations for an absence of dissent have 
often centred on the political impossibility of active opposition given the effectiveness of 
the state security apparatus, especially during the Stalinist period between 1948 and 
1953.
11
 Conservative interviewees themselves held this view; Franciska suggested that 
even the smallest public expression of opposition might incur dire penalties. Her father, 
who had been a high-ranking officer in Horthy‟s army, clashed with a prominent 
Communist politician when he failed to cancel an event which coincided with a party 
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rally. Fearing the consequences of this act, he employed extreme measures to avoid being 
caught by the police, and became paranoid when friends offered him assistance: 
 
Franciska:  I think it was 1948 when he [her father] got into trouble 
with one of the secretaries of state, who made a visit to 
our town. There was a big horse breeding fête, and the 
Communists wanted to hold a rally at the same time… 
and my father said that he couldn't do anything about it. 
And then he knew that politically he was in such an awful 
situation because he could be arrested any time, for any 
reason, or just simply he could have been suspended and 
put in prison because he was opposing the regime. So he 
was in hiding most of the time. During the day he came 
home, in the evening he disappeared. He wouldn‟t come 
home until about three o'clock in the morning, because he 
was so afraid of the secret police. That was the time when 
they arrested people in the early hours of the night. Every 
evening he went to the same pub and they would signal to 
him when they saw the police coming in, and he would 
go out the back…it was always on his mind, that you 
could be arrested for no reason…just because your family 
had a pub, or your family had land or whatever, or for 
simply no reason at all…he didn't talk about it, but I 
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knew that it was always on his mind…one evening, my 
school friend said [to him], „you can‟t go home on your 
motorbike; we will take you home!‟ But he didn't really 
know them, so he said, „Na! You have got me now! Na! 
You will get me now!‟ It was always on his mind. „You 
are going to arrest me‟… 
 
Certainly these respondents had suffered from greater discrimination than any other 
middle-class group. Those from conservative backgrounds were much more likely to be 
sidelined in post-war public life. Procedures were set up between 1945 and 1947 to 
exclude those who actively collaborated with the fascist state from returning to public 
employment or voting, but these were soon used to marginalize a wide swathe of 
conservative opinion.
12
 After 1948, the newly-established Communist state barred 
individuals from secondary or higher education, expropriated property or deported 
families
13
 on account of their affiliation with the Horthy regime and their „reactionary‟ 
political views. This marginalization convinced many conservatives of their political 
impotence. They increasingly saw themselves as helpless victims of power. 
 
However, fear of further persecution was not the only reason conservatives chose not to 
fight; in addition, they understood resistance to be a form of collaboration that 
dishonoured the individual involved. The idea of dissent as shameful was most clearly 
illustrated by those few conservatives who accidentally found themselves confronting the 
state. One man, who described himself as a „reactionary‟, had become involved in street 
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fighting with Communist vigilantes in the early 1950s. He did not use the story to present 
himself as a heroic resister. Rather, he described how the conflict had been unwanted and 
unintended (he was drunk), had left him feeling ashamed and had confirmed his decision 
to withdraw from a political life: 
 
 Dezső: …Now that involves hooliganism…we were fairly drunk 
on May 1
st
, which is a day of vigilance for Communists. 
Imre [his friend] started to throw bricks at lamps, and we 
did this because we knew the Communist vigilantes were 
there. Three of them from different sides of the street 
started to rush towards us, and the three of us „went in 
four different directions‟…So it wasn‟t bravado, it wasn‟t 
a sort of conscious heroic opposition to the regime. In a 
sense one was ashamed of it, it didn‟t really matter 
somehow…I certainly didn‟t feel that I was fighting the 
Communists, I didn‟t feel that at all. And had you asked 
me at any point, I would have said, no, no, no, I‟m an 
observer. 
 
James: So why do you think you saw yourself as an observer at 
the time? 
 
 9 
Dezső: Well, the feeling that it has nothing to do with me, it was, 
you know, imposed on me and the whole of Hungarian 
society from without. Essentially you can‟t do anything 
about it. 
 
Resistance was shameful because of its political nature. Conservatives presented 
themselves as alienated from politics from 1945 onwards.
14
 According to Magda, „right 
from then, beginning in April 1945, from the beginning of the system, we had a feeling of 
being opposed (ellenséges érzés).‟ The most appropriate response was then to become 
apolitical; according to Ildikó, „I didn‟t have any political opinions. I mean, I was a very 
strong-minded proud Hungarian woman.‟ To become political was to collaborate with the 
„anti-fascist‟ liberal-left consensus of the popular front which took power following the 
war. Márta stated that after 1945 her family „…didn't join any party, they hated 
politicians, they didn't have any opinions, they didn't like politics, politicians were not 
„termelő‟ [productive] people, at our house somebody who was termelő was a good 
person‟. 
 
They therefore avoided any activity that might bring them into political conflict with the 
Communist state after 1948. They would only engage in minor private acts of dissent 
which the state would not notice and which had no political meaning: 
 
Irén: I think we only had silent weapons [my emphasis] – not 
to do this or that or not to participate at certain events. 
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For instance, when we saw these red stars made out of 
flowers we decided not to cross that park any more. Just 
such small things, but in our family we did not really go 
against the system or resist or anything, no… 
 
Rather than resort to direct confrontation, they saw the quiet, private maintenance of pre-
Communist bourgeois and religious values as the most appropriate response to 
Communist power. Church-going was particularly popular, as it allowed conservatives to 
articulate their values „discreetly‟.15 However, it was crucial to them that this behaviour 
should not be perceived as political resistance. In this example, Ildikó emphasized that 
despite her regular church attendance, she had decided to avoid going behind the sacristy 
or taking confession; thus, she would not seem to be „demonstrating‟ against the regime: 
 
Ildikó: …I went to the church every Sunday but I didn‟t dare to 
go behind the sacristy…to talk personally [with the 
priest]…I didn‟t practise my religion but I went to church 
every Sunday. It is not practising if I go to church. 
Anybody can go to church. I just went there when there 
was a mass. I didn‟t go to a confession. I didn‟t want to 
demonstrate…I just went there. 
 
Most accounts of resistance to the early Communist state focus on the period after 1953, 
when a new post-Stalinist leadership in Moscow removed the hard-line Stalinist Rákosi 
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and installed the reformist Imre Nagy as prime minister. Explanations for increasing 
dissent are usually „top down‟. Nagy‟s attempt to curtail the arbitrary use of state power 
and to achieve a limited amount of popular legitimacy, and the political infighting 
between Rákosi and Nagy which ensued, have been presented as the crucial factors that 
weakened the Communist state and gave its critics increasing room to engage in effective 
resistance. Yet despite greater opportunity, conservatives still viewed resistance as a form 
of collaboration and refused to become involved. Dezső, for example, had socialist 
friends who had joined the central forum for dissenting voices, the Petőfi Circle. 
Although he wanted the system changed he nevertheless dismissed political resistance. 
He refused to take part because it would have made him a politically complicit „servant 
of the regime‟: 
 
Dezső: They [my friends] were perhaps nearer the regime and 
were willing to do things in a conscious way, and I 
remember quoting Illyés
16
 day-in-day-out. He was asked 
why he wasn‟t at the forefront of this movement. Illyés‟ 
answer was, „This is the revolt of the servants, and I was 
never a servant.‟ Now I remember my saying this to [my 
friends], that, well, you know, I wasn‟t a „cseléd‟ 
[servant], you know, Litván
17, yes, he was a „cseléd‟, it 
was a great thing that he did, but, you know, it wasn‟t 
really my business.  
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Whereas conservative respondents presented resistance as inappropriate and shameful, 
other respondents celebrated even minor acts of defiance: 
 
Lóránt: There were other things which were a demonstration of 
some form of independence. There was certain music, for 
example, which was completely prohibited – Wagner was 
one – and there were some underground places where 
records were played, and one went to these gatherings, 
and one felt that there were infiltrators there. One knew 
that the fact that one went to these places was reported 
somewhere. I saw this really as fumigating myself. It is in 
these little things one could assert a degree of heroism. 
It‟s a rather petty one, if you see what I mean. And it 
didn‟t do any good to anybody else. It didn‟t help 
anybody; it didn‟t set a single person free. But we 
indulged in this thing proudly. 
 
Interviewees who idealized resistance were mainly from liberal backgrounds, and were 
largely confined to those who came from entrepreneurial or professional middle-class 
milieux, including many from Jewish families. Although liberalism was a spent political 
force by 1945,
18
 it still remained an important badge of personal identity for many after 
the war, associated with the realization of progressive goals, such as land and wealth 
redistribution, within the context of a stable democratic system.
19
 Whereas conservatives 
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related how depoliticized their communities had become, liberals charted how the „anti-
fascist‟ consensus of the post-war democratic system had reinvigorated their engagement 
with politics. Their active resistance after 1948 was a result of this reawakening; it was 
this progressive democratic system they sought to restore following its destruction by the 
Communists:
20
 
 
James: So what were the politics of your family before the war? 
 
Pál: I think my family was not very political before the war 
but we were more political after it…Hungary had been a 
very conservative country and I think that the liberal 
Jewish middle class didn‟t have a major impact on it, but 
certainly between forty-five and forty-eight it looked like 
you could have more say…during the early stages of the 
[Communist] regime we were trying to guard what 
democracy had been achieved during those couple of 
post-war years basically.  
 
James: Were you political at that time [under the Communist 
regime]? 
 
Pál: Very. 
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James: Were you involved in any way? 
 
Pál: I was involved in some strange ways, on the margins. I 
remember giving a speech in 1951 when I graduated, just 
before 15 March
21…I‟ve got the original text on the 
original piece of paper, which I can show to you, and it 
was exceptionally courageous…I don‟t understand how I 
dared to say that! And why was I not immediately 
suspended? 
 
James: What was the atmosphere like? 
 
Pál: Everyone was astounded…the dean of the school, he put 
his arm around me and said, „It was wonderful, but you 
have to be very careful because you are not only 
endangering yourself and your family, but you are 
endangering the school as well.‟ 
 
Pál used this story to present resistance as a viable response to the Stalinist state, even 
before 1953. He contrasted himself with the rest of society, represented by the hierarchy 
of the school, which had become atomized and fearful of expressing opinions. He saw 
himself as part of a liberal tradition which took inspiration from the democratic 
movements of both 1848 and 1945-8 and which dared to speak to Communist power. 
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Liberals also engaged in greater resistance than other groups because they did not see 
themselves as likely victims of an all-powerful state. Unlike conservatives, who avoided 
expressing even the smallest forms of dissent for fear of being victimized, they did not 
envisage that they would be severely punished for their active opposition. Rózsa, for 
example, was involved in an organization that aimed to overthrow the state, should the 
opportunity arise: 
 
Rózsa: …[we] did a little bit of propaganda, against the regime, 
and a little bit of sabotage…and I would draft 
pamphlets…and they would distribute them in the 
village, and perhaps I would distribute a couple in Újpest 
and just stick them up somewhere. They were little home-
made things; that was the sort of organization. It didn‟t 
have a name or anything. 
 
Despite this, she was surprised when two of her colleagues were executed and she herself 
received a prison sentence. Even when involved in a terrorist anti-state organization, she 
believed that she „hardly did anything‟ and expected that the Communist state would 
judge her opposition more fairly: 
 
Rózsa: …I mean I wasn‟t really doing anything, come to think of 
it (laughs)…although it was nothing, in objective terms, 
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they hadn‟t done anything at all, in the end two of them 
were executed…my husband got a life sentence and I got 
fourteen years for that. We hardly did anything. 
 
Whilst liberals engaged in dissenting activities throughout the early Communist period, 
the extent to which they resisted at any given time was determined by the opportunities 
provided by the system. Before 1953, most felt that open, direct opposition was 
impossible. Rather, they engaged in what James C. Scott termed „infrapolitical‟ 
resistance;
22
 finding subtle, indirect ways to undermine power that would be difficult to 
detect or punish. Liberal respondents reported that they used graffiti, rumour-mongering 
and joke-telling: 
 
Dávid: Well for example, there were some serious cases at the 
school – the walls always had to be decorated, the 
pictures of our leaders were always there…I think on one 
occasion we had a special May 1 decoration and the 
slogan „Éljen Rákosi‟ was put up and someone in pencil 
put an F in front of Éljen, which became Féljen, and 
instead of „Long Live Rákosi‟, it said „Rákosi should be 
afraid‟, and they were searching the whole school and 
questioning students and they never found out who did it. 
Of course we knew who did it. 
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Liberals presented the death of Stalin in 1953 as a turning point. Under a weakened state, 
they began to form networks of opposition. Army service was often mentioned by men as 
an environment in which they discovered that those from other social backgrounds were 
equally alienated from the regime. No longer believing that they were isolated in their 
anti-Communism, they were spurred on to further oppositional activity: 
 
Ödön:  The only place where you could eventually find out 
about people‟s real thinking was the army…masks fell 
away from a certain number of people and I still 
remember how shocked I was when one of these peasant 
boys, who owed everything to the Communist Party, told 
me once, when we were resting between two bouts of 
exercise, „they only have to teach me how to get behind 
enemy lines and they will never see me again‟ 
(laughs)…So, very paradoxically, in the army, where you 
suffer from restrictions…we had more freedom there 
because people talked to each other, especially when 
there was a person-to-person situation. You were sent 
out, two people to stand guard in front of the 
ammunition…and, you know, between two and four in 
the morning you walk up and down there, and you 
struggle against sleep and you are much more honest with 
each other. 
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Unlike conservatives, liberals‟ idealization of resistance meant that after 1953 they were 
prepared to use the greater opportunities available to them under a weakened state to 
express new forms of dissent in public places. However, their earlier experience of 
„infrapolitical‟ resistance meant that they still disguised their activities to avoid 
punishment. Pál hid his new public opposition behind a demonstration which appeared to 
be focussing on a non-political sporting issue: 
 
Pál: The first time I protested in the street followed the 
Hungarian football team‟s defeat by the West Germans 
[in the World Cup Final] in 1954. We decided that we 
must pray that the Hungarians be defeated. I should say 
that we weren‟t interested in football. I was anxiously 
sitting in front of the radio and delighted at every goal 
that they let in, because I knew that it might lead to 
demonstrations in Budapest…because the Communist 
Party so much associated itself with sporting glories, that 
when there wasn‟t any glory they had to suffer from 
it…and for about half an hour I was walking with the 
demonstration demanding the dismissal of the Minister of 
Sport, and I do think this was a run-up to the [1956] 
uprising. 
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Both liberals and conservatives were opposed to the Communist state after 1948. Yet 
whereas conservatives withdrew from political activity, liberals idealized the political 
fight against Communism, and found greater room to engage in public resistance after 
1953. By contrast, left-wing respondents had a more ambivalent attitude towards the new 
regime than either of these groups. Support for leftist ideologies had been growing within 
the intellectual and professional middle class since the turn of the century:
23
 some had 
supported the short-lived Communist regime of 1919;
24
 many more were pushed further 
to the left by the political success of right-wing authoritarianism in the inter-war period.
25
 
The experience of wartime German occupation and the Holocaust further radicalized 
many younger and Jewish members of the middle class, propelling them towards the 
Communist party as the best protection against Fascism‟s return after 1945:26  
 
James: So can you tell me the story of how you joined the 
party…who invited you or… 
 
Ádám: I came over from Buda to Pest. Buda was freed a bit later 
from the German occupation than Pest. My big task was 
how to join a movement that would guarantee to me that 
the Germans, those fascists, would not be able to occupy 
Hungary again, or at least they would not be backed by 
society if something awful was to happen again. So I was 
openly looking for left-wing anti-fascist movements… 
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Despite an initial enthusiasm for the Communist party,
27
 many left-wingers from the 
middle class reassessed their support following their experience of show trials, anti-
bourgeois discrimination and the rigidly imposed Soviet Stalinist economic model. Most 
had questioned their faith in the Communist state by the early 1950s.
28
 Before the death 
of Stalin, however, they did not view resistance as an appropriate way to express their 
opposition. 
 
Prior to 1953, socialists did not oppose Stalinism actively because they were neither 
willing nor able to engage with the political sphere. Their alienation from the Communist 
movement left most disenchanted with politics and ashamed at having supported an 
oppressive system. Sándor was radicalized during his army service where he saw 
peasants committing suicide as a result of collectivization. Disillusioned and 
embarrassed, he withdrew from politics and „tended his gardens‟: 
 
Sándor: During my army service it became clear what was going 
on in the country…I think we succeeded once or twice to 
keep the old men from hanging themselves. But then I 
thought that that‟s not really what we really want to do, 
and kind of decided to „tend my gardens‟. I don‟t think I 
decided to fight or oppose or whatever…not, no, I was in 
no way political or in any way active until the spring of 
1956…I don‟t say that I was in deep mourning when 
Joseph Vissarionovich died, but I was shocked, I still 
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thought that Joseph Stalin was the commander of the 
liberating armies…but then that‟s typical metropolitan 
intellectual „big mouthiness‟… 
 
Their withdrawal from politics was also due to the erosion of their belief that they were 
qualified to critique the system effectively. They had internalized the Communist idea 
that they were, at best, reformed members of the „former exploiting classes‟, and were 
not able to judge the best interests of „the masses‟. Their final disaffection with the 
movement was seldom presented as the product of their own experiences; rather, their 
stories of departure nearly always focussed on the discovery of the suffering of other 
social groups – such as poor peasants (see the above quotation) or the urban working 
class – to which the Communist state was expected to provide advantages. 
 
Lastly, socialists refused to express opposition because they were unable to find social 
spaces in which to resist the regime in meaningful ways. Liberals were able to find 
opportunities for dissent despite the Stalinist state‟s effective control of the public sphere 
because they valued „infrapolitical resistance‟ at the margins. For socialists, the only 
significant form of resistance was direct, open criticism of abuses of power and such 
opportunities were not available to them in the early 1950s. 
 
Socialists began to criticize the regime publicly only after the Stalinist system started to 
be dismantled in 1953. Many used stylized anecdotes of an everyday experience which 
followed Stalin‟s death in order to illustrate the way in which Hungarian society suddenly 
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had become willing to challenge Communist power. Mihály, a left-leaning respondent 
who had turned his back on the party, had been sent to report for radio on a Russian 
version of Hamlet. Despite the presence of Révai, the former Minister of Education, at 
the theatre, the audience was now prepared to murmur ideologically unacceptable 
comments at the Russian actors. The spectators repeated the brutish phrases they 
remembered from the Soviet occupation in 1945, thus tarnishing the Communist-
sponsored image of the Red Army as the liberators of Hungary from Fascism:
29
  
 
Mihály: The big Russian theatres came to Hungary and were 
performing Hamlet in Russian and a lot of people were 
there. Everybody knew that nobody would understand 
anything, but it was packed, and I was there from the 
radio. We were behind Révai‟s box and there was a scene 
where the ghost is talking to Hamlet and the actor was 
just repeating „Gamlet Gamlet!‟30, and there was an 
incredible murmur of „Gamlet, Gamlet, Idi syuda, davai 
chasy!‟ [Hamlet, Hamlet, Come Here, Give Me Your 
Watch]…everybody in the audience thought they alone 
were murmuring that stupid thing, and then the actor also 
said, „Gamlet, Gamlet, Idi syuda, davai chasy!‟ That was 
the Russians in forty-five: „idi syuda, davai chasy!‟ I‟ll 
never forget Révai‟s face; it lengthened and paled. Then 
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the entire audience was whispering, „Gamlet, Gamlet, idi 
syuda, davai chasy‟. 
 
Their expression of resistance after 1953 was primarily the result of a re-engagement 
with politics. After Stalin‟s death, a new leadership in Moscow insisted that the Stalinist 
regime under Rákosi be replaced by a less hard-line government. In July 1953, a 
reformist leadership under Imre Nagy began their „New Course‟, a programme which 
advocated a more flexible approach to the agricultural and industrial sectors, an end to 
the arbitrariness of political persecution and an attempt to gain a limited popular 
legitimacy.
31
 This revitalized socialists‟ faith in the possibilities of Communism and 
induced them to re-enter the political sphere. Mátyás, for example, had found his support 
for Communism severely shaken following the deportations of relatives and friends 
whom he knew to be sincere „anti-fascists‟, but after 1953 had his faith in the possibilities 
of Communism restored: 
 
Mátyás: There was the deportation of my relatives, which we were 
unbelievably shaken by, but still we disregarded it and 
continued to be Communists. But I felt very ashamed 
then and to tell you the truth I still do. I was really 
ashamed because of that. We didn't support them [the 
party]…and it was not very nice, but I‟m sure that this 
heightened sense of shame contributed to the fact that, 
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when Imre Nagy came in 1953, we changed very quickly, 
if you like, we were on a new road… 
 
Reinvigorated by the possibility of fighting for a more democratic form of Communism, 
these respondents were now prepared to resist the attempted re-imposition of hard-line 
Stalinism when Rákosi mounted a political comeback in spring 1955. Jenő decided to 
confront Rákosi himself at a district meeting of the Communist Party:  
 
Jenő: From 1954 onwards, I was consciously in opposition 
within the party. This was especially so when in March 
1955 Imre Nagy was relieved of the post of prime 
minister…I felt it was necessary to take on the anti-
Stalinist fight against Rákosi, as did my friends…I was 
indignant I was going to fight against [Nagy‟s] 
marginalization and sacking. Then in the spring of 1956 
directly after the Twentieth Party Congress in the Soviet 
Union, an unexpected opportunity arose for me to do 
something in the interests of this struggle. In the district 
where I taught, they informed us about Khrushchev‟s 
secret speech and about Stalin‟s crimes being 
revealed…They invited me to this [meeting] and 
unexpectedly Mátyás Rákosi himself came. He sat there 
and listened for an hour and a half to a roll call of Stalin‟s 
crimes and nodded his head like this. After this I put my 
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hand up and rose to speak and I said that now there was a 
big opportunity internationally to renew the Communist 
movement, not on a Stalinist basis but putting the 
movement on an entirely new footing. I argued that it 
could be done here in Hungary, but the party leadership is 
preventing it, because they are holding to past political 
errors, and then I spoke out, saying that neither the people 
nor the party membership have any more faith in the 
present person of the party leader, Comrade Rákosi, who 
is sitting beside me…it had a great effect, not just there, 
but all over. It wasn‟t in the newspapers, but it spread by 
word of mouth throughout Budapest in two days. I 
presumed that he would not dare to arrest me, and if he 
arrested me he was once again turning against the 
people…which would result in a strong movement for his 
removal… 
 
In addition, socialists now had public fora in which they were able to criticize power 
directly. We should not always assume that greater opportunity is sufficient reason to 
explain an outburst of dissent. Socialists withdrew from dissent before 1953 not because 
resistance per se was unthinkable, but because the type of resistance they wanted to 
express – open, direct and public – was impossible. Such resistance became feasible only 
during the increasingly open intellectual environment of Nagy‟s Hungary. At dissident 
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intellectual meetings such as those held by the Petőfi Circle, or at public demonstrations 
such as the one which followed the reburial of Rajk,
32
 socialists discovered the social 
spaces in which they thought it appropriate to express opposition. Alajos‟ testimony 
illustrated this change; he had initially turned away from the Communist movement in 
the early 1950s, disheartened by the lack of intellectual freedom and restrictions on his 
travel. However, without any public outlet for his opposition, he decided to „play along‟: 
 
James:  So what did you mean by ‘playing along’ in the early 
fifties? 
 
Alajos: Oh, it meant that…I was learning Russian properly at 
school, and went to meetings of the Young Communist 
League…so I mean I didn‟t oppose the regime in any 
active sense before 1953, this is clear, before the death of 
Stalin…that is, if I had thoughts I noted them down. I 
kept a diary. Things which I disagreed with, I wrote them 
down in my diary. 
 
Alajos emphasised that for him „real resistance‟ began only in 1956. Unlike liberals, he 
had not valued the secret opposition he had engaged in prior to this. Only after the 
Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, where Khrushchev‟s denunciation of 
„Stalinist excesses‟ gave reformists license to criticize Stalinism publicly, did his „fun‟ 
begin: 
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Alajos: Now fun – fun started really in fifty-six after the 
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, because 
then you could actually openly challenge people in 
seminars, and not only Hungarian literature 
seminars…but in Marxist-Leninist seminars too, you 
could say more or less what you thought…I was a 
member of the Petőfi Circle… I went to the famous press 
debate in the Petőfi Circle which was absolute 
pandemonium, I mean, after which, had Rákosi arrested 
the five thousand people who were there, he could have 
gotten away with it, but he didn‟t have enough power to 
do that…on 6 October 1956 you had the Rajk 
Reburial…when I was coming out after the speeches…I 
saw a little group with a flag and they were sort of 
beckoning to me to join in. I joined in, and then I found 
somebody…a bloke I knew from the Széchényi library 
who said, „Somebody told me there‟s going to be a 
demonstration‟. „Where are you going to?‟ „Oh, we‟re 
going to Hősök Tere [Heroes‟ Square], and then to the 
Batthyány Örökmécses.‟ This is a flame in memory of 
Lajós Batthyány who was the Prime Minister of Hungary 
in 1849, and was executed.
33
 This is a kind of place 
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where people go, sort of a „Martyrs‟ Corner‟. All right, so 
I joined the group. It wasn‟t particularly political, but we 
started producing slogans together…between 1945 and 
1948, the Communist party slogan was: „We‟re not going 
to stop half-way. Let reaction perish!‟ So we adapted this 
slogan, instead of saying „reaction‟ saying „Stalinism‟, so 
„We are not going to stop half-way. Let Stalinism perish!‟ 
And then we shouted over and over, two hundred people, 
as we marched with this flag, and people looked at us, 
and they didn‟t understand what was going on…I read 
out a poem by Atilla József,
34
 which is a patriotic poem 
ending with the words, „So that we shouldn‟t be a 
German colony‟, but I read, „So we shouldn‟t be a foreign 
colony‟. 
 
The extent and type of resistance respondents expressed was determined as much by 
complex social codes that surrounded political engagement as by the opportunities they 
had to oppose the state. Despite greater possibilities for opposing the Communist state 
after 1953, only socialists and liberals did so. Regardless of opportunities, conservatives 
saw political engagement as a form of collaboration and looked to withdraw into the 
private sphere. Liberals idealized active opposition as they had been politicized by their 
experience of post-war democracy and wished to fight for its return after 1948; they 
initially resisted only at the margins, but increasingly found semi-public arenas in which 
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to express dissent after 1953. Despite quickly moving against the Communist state they 
had initially supported, socialists refrained from resistance until 1953; only when 
politically re-engaged by the hope of reforming the Communist state and given 
opportunities for direct, public dissent did they view it as an appropriate activity. 
 
These different attitudes towards resistance continued to shape individuals‟ behaviour 
even in October 1956, when Budapest became the epicentre of the most powerful popular 
uprising during the early Communist period in central-eastern Europe. The revolt was 
initiated by student demonstrations on 23 October, but by the time the uprising was put 
down on 4 November a wide spectrum of Hungary‟s urban population had played a role. 
The question of social involvement has been a central one both for a range of political 
forces since 1956, who have used the social makeup of the resisters to advocate particular 
political interpretations of the uprising,
35
 and for historians, who have attempted to 
pinpoint the backgrounds and aims of the revolutionaries. The re-constituted Hungarian 
Socialist Workers‟ Party under Kádár manipulated the question of involvement; they 
presented the post-1956 Communist state as the saviour of Hungary from a counter-
revolution led by reactionary forces intent on restoring Fascism. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, historians focussed on the role of dissenting intellectuals and young, 
reformist-minded students in starting revolutionary movements.
36
 In the 1970s, the left-
wing British sociologist Bill Lomax argued that urban workers and their factory councils 
were the real embodiment of heroism.
37
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the dissident socialist 
opposition was increasingly united around the image of 1956 as a fight for a more 
democratic form of socialism by reform Communist intellectuals. Since 1991, a multi-
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party democracy has spawned a range of political forces who claim to bear the mantle of 
1956: conservative nationalist politicians, for instance, have increasingly presented the 
uprising as a „fight for freedom‟ by „ordinary people‟ who took to street fighting in the 
name of liberal democracy.
38
 This resistance-obsessed historiography has produced some 
excellent studies of the participation of various social groups. However, there has been 
less interest in producing a comparative framework which examines the varied, and often 
ambivalent, responses that different groups had to the uprising. 
 
Oral history testimony reflected the debates within Hungary since 1956 about 
involvement in the uprising as much as it illustrated participation at the time. On one 
hand, respondents‟ narratives demonstrated how mobilization was closely linked with 
traditions of resistance within certain social groups. On the other, testimony was strongly 
influenced by the widespread idealization of active resistance against the Communist 
state in the years since 1956. These two pressures often meant that personal narratives 
about 1956 were contradictory or potentially misleading: respondents celebrated the 
martyrs of 1956 as heroes whilst condemning their friends who took part, or created 
imaginary roles for themselves when they were not involved. Rather than see these 
contradictory stories as problematic and inaccurate, they should be viewed as complex 
narratives which reveal the ways in which individuals have attempted to reconcile their 
own involvement with the ways in which their society now expects the story of 1956 to 
be told. 
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Many conservatives idealized the uprising, despite abhorring political resistance before 
1956. Bálint characterized it as a „morally clean‟ revolution in which the nation was 
unified in struggle. He identified with the aims of the younger generation and workers, 
who he argued were the driving forces behind the revolution: 
 
Bálint:  It was an absolutely morally clean revolution – we were 
there so our impressions were direct ones. There was no 
looting…not one single case of looting. It‟s so 
unusual…whenever there is an uprising the first thing is 
that people go looting…those who took part were all 
young people and it was not the intellectuals. Those who 
actively took part were not from the political strata but 
from the most suppressed ones: workers, young people, 
even some from the army or police…They were workers 
and simple people…no aristocrats, no noble people who 
were deprived of all their fortunes and so on. It was a 
spontaneous rising up in favour of something better. 
 
In this quotation, he challenged those who demonized the revolution by questioning its 
social makeup, rejecting the Communist-sponsored image of 1956 as a reactionary 
aristocratic counter-revolution. He also refuted the left-wing interpretation which 
emphasized the role of dissident Communist Party intellectuals in fermenting the 
uprising, preferring to identify with the role of the „suppressed‟ and „simple‟ people who 
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spontaneously wanted „something better‟. The revolution was stripped of its political 
nuances in order that he could identify with its heroic protagonists. However, when asked 
about his own participation, he denied any personal involvement and categorized active 
insurgents as collaborators (who were prepared to „adapt to the circumstances‟), from 
whom he had tried to distance himself in the aftermath of the revolution: 
 
James : So in 1956, were any of your family or friends involved? 
 
Bálint: No, no, I mean, no close relatives were involved…we did 
not have any direct contact to those who were actively 
involved… 
 
James: So what do you think the reason was? 
 
Bálint:  Well (sighs), we, no one in our family is of a 
revolutionary type. I mean, we are not fond of extremities 
…We were never involved in politics at all…we were 
patriots and Christians…we were considered to be people 
who would never give in, we would never fight against 
them [i.e the Communists] openly, or demonstrate against 
them, carrying posters and banners in the streets. We 
simply disliked them and did not believe in them. That‟s 
all. So we were not dangerous for them… 
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James: So what did you think of the people who were actively 
involved [in the 1956 uprising]? 
 
Bálint: Well, in some cases we tried to understand their situation 
[of those who participated in the uprising], about their 
motivations, but this did not mean we agreed with 
them…They were prepared to adapt themselves to the 
circumstances, so they were ready to collaborate to some 
extent…Now, especially in the cases of those who were 
heavily involved, we tried to minimise contacts with 
them.  
 
These respondents now have a divided memory of the events of 1956. They have 
accepted the idea, promoted by conservatives in post-Communist Hungary, that 1956 was 
a gallant (if tragic) first step in the fight against Communism. In this historically 
decontextualized interpretation, the uprising has become a symbol of the fight for 
democratic freedoms and national independence which were achieved after 1989. In 
conservative collective memory, the reform Communist revolutionary leader Imre Nagy 
has been stripped of his socialist past and has come to be remembered primarily as a 
nationalist hero.
39
 On the other hand, this new interpretation clashed with their earlier 
abhorrence of resistance and their idealization of inner emigration and political 
 34 
withdrawal. Conservatives therefore found it difficult to construct a coherent narrative 
which reconciled these opposing views of the uprising. 
 
Conservatives wished to be seen as reliable witnesses of the courageousness of the 
struggle. Yet they often stressed their absence from the uprising, for fear of being seen as 
active revolutionaries. Resolving the tension inherent in being an absent yet trustworthy 
witness was a central theme of their stories. Mária achieved this by placing herself at the 
end of a telephone; it was thus possible for her to give a personalized running account of 
the action whilst deflecting any suspicion that she was a participant: 
 
Mária:  In the summer of 1956 we really could feel the situation 
thawing. I didn‟t want to believe it, when on the 
afternoon the 23 October 1956 an acquaintance 
telephoned from the city centre and said that the 
revolution had broken out, and told us he was going to 
tear down the Stalin statue. He worked there at 
Damjanich street, where the Stalin statue was. I said that 
it couldn‟t have happened, it was impossible. Then on the 
following day we realized that revolution had really 
broken out, everybody joined together, there was such 
peace, there was such love, everybody expressed their 
love for everybody else… 
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Where they became involved in the uprising, conservatives did not attempt to hide the 
fact: their post-Communist celebration of 1956 has meant that a minimal involvement is 
not a source for shame or regret. However, their earlier abhorrence of direct confrontation 
continued to shape their narratives: they presented their roles as unintentional and denied 
that their actions constituted political resistance. Erzsébet treated the injured Hungarian 
fighters and Soviet troops. She portrayed her involvement as neutral (she was 
accidentally asked), humanitarian (as she helped both sides equally) and apolitical (she 
had no interest in the meaning of the revolution even whilst it was happening). Even 
where conservatives found themselves caught up in the uprising, their testimony 
confirmed the absence of a culture of political resistance: 
 
Erzsébet: And when the problems started in fifty-six, we acted 
together, replacing all those who couldn‟t come in for the 
next shift. The medical students who were on the 
premises were asked if we could do the normal shift 
work…my husband became the ambulance man and I 
was the assistant – so we transported the injured, 
whatever their origin. We picked up Hungarians, 
Russians. Anybody who was injured, we treated them 
equally. 
 
James: Can you tell me some more of your experiences of that? 
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Erzsébet: At that time you didn't try to analyse anything, you just 
had a task to perform, and didn't ask why I am doing this, 
what the future might bring, it didn‟t enter the thought 
process…there was a lack of interest in political 
happenings, and political life, I suppose, at that time, as 
well. 
 
Unlike conservative respondents, liberals and socialists did not find the presentation of 
their own involvement in the 1956 uprising problematic. They lived in a political culture 
which idealized active resistance during 1956, and are now part of a post-Communist 
culture which also celebrates participation in the uprising. They therefore pushed 
involvement in the uprising to the forefront of their narratives. One socialist respondent 
gave himself a crucial role in the uprising, claiming that he had started it by 
marginalizing the importance of another demonstration: 
 
Alajos: I was one of the organizers of the student demonstration 
on 23 October 1956…I – actually, four of us – started the 
organization on the 22 October…I was the one who stood 
up for the demonstration at the faculty. There were two 
groups which demonstrated the next day. One of them 
started from the Petőfi statue, the other group started in 
Buda from the Műegyetem [Polytechnic], marching to the 
Bem statue, but without slogans, that was a silent 
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demonstration. Our demonstration was the real one in a 
sense, because we shouted slogans and people knew what 
we wanted, and I was the person who actually said to 
about ten thousand people, „Okay, start!‟ (laughs). So my 
wife sometimes says, „My husband started the Hungarian 
revolution!‟ 
 
Lóránt, a liberal, presented himself as a revolutionary hero whose resistance activities 
prior to 1956 had prepared him for a role in the uprising as a member of a revolutionary 
Workers‟ Council and organizer of a potential armed insurgency: 
 
James: So what other things would constitute your own personal 
heroism? 
 
Lóránt: …I don‟t think I was a great hero until about late fifty-
five when there was this general livening up of things, 
and there was the Petőfi Kör and I was fairly active there. 
By that time I was working in industry. At the place 
where I worked I organized a small group and taught 
them English which was definitely a non-official thing to 
do. During the actual events of 1956, I was quite active in 
the middle of Budapest, and also in this factory where I 
worked and there I was elected a member of the Workers‟ 
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Council. We also organized, we made trenches, and we 
collected weapons, and then we got in touch with some 
secret groups which used to belong to the Hungarian 
army… 
 
Some respondents from these backgrounds invented narratives of involvement, despite 
not having taken part in the uprising. There was no intended deception; their fictional 
nature was made explicit. Rather, these imaginary stories should be read a manifestation 
of liberal and socialist identity; stories of active political opposition were considered 
more important than what one actually did. Viktor‟s well thought-out narrative about 
what he might have done was more important to him than what had actually happened: 
 
Viktor: If I had been in Budapest at the time, on 22 or 23 
October, I‟m sure that I would have joined up with the 
university students, even if I was working. 
 
James: So how…. why do you think you would have been 
involved in the demonstration on 23 October? 
 
Viktor: Because I‟ve always been a little bit, sort of, 
revolutionary. I like to be different, you know…I never 
considered myself a courageous man who would have 
been on the barricades on the front line in the Corvin Köz 
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[Corvin Alley].
40
 But I would have been involved, 
definitely, I would have been involved, not because I feel 
I‟m a revolutionary, but I‟m a bit of a free thinker. You 
know what I mean. And I don‟t really like to comply all 
the time and get put into a melting pot and be the same as 
the others. 
 
Regardless of whether individual respondents were involved, all liberals and socialists 
testified to cultures of resistance which had been built up in the years preceding the 
revolution and led to a very rapid mobilization against the Communist state. By contrast, 
conservatives, even during the first great challenge to Communist power in central-
eastern Europe, still considered direct political confrontation abhorrent. Their celebration 
of 1956 was the result only of a later nationalist idealization of anti-Communist 
resistance. 
 
In the immediate post-Fascist and post-Communist periods, stories of resistance to the 
previous regime have come to dominate history writing and have been shaped by the 
political needs of new states. For instance, historians in post-war West and East Germany 
sought to use resistance stories to legitimate their new state and demonize the other 
across the Iron Curtain. Western historians presented their republic as the inheritor of 
conservative resistance against Nazism and its population as untainted by support for 
fascism; in the east, by contrast, the Communist state presented itself as the heirs of 
Communist anti-Fascist resistance, and West Germany as the refuge for supporters of 
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Hitler‟s regime.41 A similar phenomenon has emerged in post-Communist central-eastern 
Europe. At the sitting of the first post-Communist Hungarian parliament, the following 
declaration preceded all business: „The Uprising of 1956 laid the foundation for the hope 
that it is possible to achieve a democratic social order, and that no sacrifice for our 
country‟s independence is made in vain. Although the ensuing suppression reinstated the 
old power structure, it could not eradicate the spirit of 1956 from people‟s minds.‟ Just as 
the two post-war Germanies erased those traditions of resistance which did not help to 
legitimate their new states, so the varied motives for dissent in Hungary were forgotten 
and the story of resistance shaped into a struggle whose inevitable outcome was the 
liberal democratic state in 1989.
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The obsession with heroic confrontation serves to reinforce ahistorical, post-Communist 
celebrations of dissent; we should develop a comparative social history which transcends 
the narrow demands of post-1989 national historiographies and instead addresses the 
wide variety of strategies that people used to live in opposition. Although groups from 
across the Hungarian political spectrum now celebrate active involvement in the 1956 
uprising, at the time there existed vastly differing ideas about how to live under 
illegitimate power; some asserted the need to confront the state directly, whilst others 
believed that withdrawal into an apolitical private existence was more appropriate.  
 
Yet, in general, new social histories have not yet challenged the established stories of 
monolithic heroic resistance in central-eastern Europe; in Poland, for example, dominant 
narratives still stress the ability of unified working-class resistance to reach across 
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political and class divides and become a mouthpiece for Polish society as a whole.
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Superficially, at least, Polish resistance appeared much less politically fractured than in 
Hungary. Firstly, the country was not divided by the experience of a collaborationist state 
during the Second World War. Secondly, researchers have noted that amongst the Polish 
working class there existed a social memory of shared persecution by outsiders (the 
Jewish-German middle class of the interwar era, the wartime German occupation and 
then the post-war Soviet occupation) that shaped a collective sense of class and national 
interest to be defended. 
 
Yet some studies have started the attempt to dismantle the idea of monolithic societal 
resistance and investigate the range of strategies used by Poles. Despite widespread 
opposition, some revisionist scholars have begun to address why certain groups decided 
to accommodate themselves to the Communist state.
44
 Others have examined how social 
divides between different dissenters shaped very different approaches to resistance. In 
particular, some studies have emphasized the role of gender; for example, male protesters 
in heavy industry and shipbuilding frequently stressed the role of men in defending 
Poland and Polish workers‟ rights, and deliberately excluded women from public 
confrontation with the state. By contrast, some women viewed male, working-class 
protest as a form of collaboration as it accepted the state‟s assumptions that only labour 
issues were a legitimate cause for confrontation whereas domestic and consumer issues 
were not. These women chose very different (and often more successful) strategies to 
express their opposition.
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 Only by removing ourselves from the demands of the post-
Communist celebration of dissent, by accepting the overwhelming absence of open 
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protest against Communist states, and by addressing the variety of valid ways in which 
people chose to live in opposition, can we hope to create a sophisticated social history of 
resistance in central-eastern Europe. 
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